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LEGAL PROBLEMS OF COMPUTER ABUSE
SUSAN HUBBELL NYCUM*
Computer abuse consists of incidents caused by intentional acts from
which a perpetrator realized or could have realized a gain and/or a
victim suffered or could have suffered a loss.1 This paper focuses on
the legal problems of computer abuse; the material presented herein is
based on a multi-year study supported in part by the National Science
Foundation. The study now includes an analysis of over 500 reported
incidents of computer abuse (the "case file"). Data concerning the
abuses was gathered from sources including the news media; inter-
views with victims and perpetrators; access to public and private
files, including police and auditor investigative reports, arrest and
search warrants, charges, trial transcripts, and court opinions. Approx-
imately fifty percent of the case files have been verified by the investi-
gators' personal contact with the participants. Thirty of the cases have
been investigated in the field.
As of August 1977, the losses associated with incidents of computer
abuse, excluding the Equity Funding fraud of 19732 which resulted in
losses exceeding $2 billion, were over $100 million. Losses have aver-
aged $5 million per year over an eleven year period and, in the past
five years, losses have increased to an average of $10 million per year.
Since 1958, the occurrence of reported cases has grown virtually ex-
ponentially as a result of the increasing use of computer technology in
sensitive areas of activity in both the public and private sectors. Unfor-
* Attorney, Chickering and Gregory, San Francisco, California. Ms. Nycum is
the co-author of COMPUTERS AND THE LAW (1975), is on the Board of Directors of the
Computer Law Association, and is vice-chairperson of the American Bar Association
Section on Science and Technology.
1. The terminology was adopted as a term of art in the law by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. See United States v. Jones, 553 F.2d 351
(4th Cir. 1977).
2. In this $2 billion fraud scheme, which was discovered in 1973, the Equity
Funding Corporation of America "created" 64,000 bogus insurance policies-by use
of the computer-to sell to reinsurers. This computer abuse has resulted in 22 con-
victions on federal charges and at least 50 major law suits. See generally D. PARKER,
CRIME BY COMPUTER 118-74 (1976).
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tunately, the support functions which made that technology imper-
vious to misuse have not kept pace with the abuse. This security lag
has provided the opportunity for injury.
Abuses have been categorized by the study in several ways, but the
following are of principal interest: injury to computer hardware and
system software; injury to computerized data and applications pro-
grams; injury in which the computer was the perpetrating device; injury
in which the computer was used as a symbol, e.g., for intimidation or
deception.
The category of "inspec" or "nonspec" differentiation separates
those incidents in which the computer was used in accordance with
proper specifications, but the data inputted or outputted was improp-
erly altered (inspec), from those in which the computer processes them-
selves were compromised (nonspec). The more sophisticated abuses
are in the nonspec category; however, monetary losses to date have
resulted more frequently from inspec abuses.
Seventeen perpetrators have been personally interviewed to date.
The perpetrators are generally highly intelligent, aggressive, verbal,
and eager; in many respects they are desirable employees. Perpetra-
tors are usually young, between eighteen and forty-six years of age,
with a mean age of twenty-nine and a median age of twenty-five. They
are generally skilled, and managerial and technical skills predominate.
Of the seventeen perpetrators, eleven performed their acts from posi-
tions of trust and fifty percent of the acts required collusion (in con-
trast to white collar criminals generally, who work alone eighty-nine
percent of the time). While thirteen perpetrators deviated insignifi-
cantly from the accepted practices of their associates (the differential
association syndrome), twelve perpetrators evidenced the Robin Hood
syndrome: they considered harming people to be wrongful, but ration-
alized harming organizations and particularly computers in organiza-
tions. In addition, fifteen perpetrators considered the act an intellec-
tual challenge; they enjoyed pitting their technical skill against the in-
transigent machine. Eight perpetrators received known financial gain
averaging $500,000 per case, with a range of $1,400 to $1,500,000.
Their occupations ranged from time-sharing computer service users and
business programmers, to presidents of computer-related firms, sales
managers, directors of data processing operations within organizations,









No action taken 4
Perpetrator hired by the victim 1
Legal aspects of computer abuse are best discussed in the context
of the taxonomy of computer abuse itself: acts directed at computers
or computer systems; acts directed at computerized assets; acts in which
the computer itself is the perpetrating tool or device; and acts in which
a computer may or may not be involved but nevertheless is the symbol
of the abuse.
In the first category-acts directed at computer equipment-the
legal analysis is traditional, because these assets are tangible personal
property, and the acts are recognizable under familiar principles of law.
The wrongful taking of computers fits conveniently into traditional
forms of theft, involving both larceny or outside theft and embezzle-
ment or inside theft. Similarly, capture of a computer and holding
it for ransom has legal elements analogous to those of criminal extortion
or other crimes comprised of acts against personal property and the
ownership or possession thereof.
On the other hand, acts of abuse directed toward computer systems
are not easily categorized under the familiar legal concepts applied to
tangible personal property. For example, when the computer itself is
unharmed, but the software has been altered or destroyed, it is difficult
to analyze the act in traditional criminal law terms. A prosecutor may
be unable to frame an indictment for malicious mischief, because
some malicious mischief statutes, and cases interpreting them, address
the damage to or injury of a tangible.3 When the tangible, in this case
the computer, is left unharmed, but the software which enables it to
function is compromised, there is no discernible injury to any physical
representation.
There are several incidents in the case file where this situation has
occurred. In one case, a very sophisticated injury was inflicted upon
3. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:122-1, :170-36 (West 1969); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 3304(a) (Purdon 1973); TEX. STAT. ANN., PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 7,
5 28.03(a)(1) (Vernon 1974).
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a large life insurance company. The company's numerous branch of-
fices collected large amounts of data each day, which was stored on
remote terminals. After the close of business, the computer at the cen-
tral site would automatically poll the various branch offices by activating
the remote terminals and causing them to transmit the day's trans-
actions to the central site. A group of perpetrators managed to
simulate the electronic impulses which initiated the transfer of the data.
Using public telephones, the perpetrators called the branch offices at
random, and caused the branch office terminals to attempt to transmit
the data. As a result, the computer tapes were unwound and, when
the real host computer polled the remote site, the remote terminals
were unable to respond. This sabotage resulted in a loss of thousands
of dollars to the insurance company, including out-of-pocket expenses
for a period of several weeks during which the company and hardware
vendor attempted to locate the perpetrators. The perpetrators, it was
discovered, were disgruntled Customer Engineers of the computer
hardware vendor who serviced the installed hardware at the insurance
company.
The significance of this case from a legal standpoint arises from the
discovery by the prosecutor, the District Attorney for Westchester Coun-
ty, New York, that a New York statute prohibiting obscene or harassing
telephone calls was the only applicable legal sanction. Violation of this
statute is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine, which is not fully respon-
sive to the injury incurred. 4 Unfortunately, this incident may not be
unique to the insurance industry. The increasing use of point-of-sale
devices, which may transmit data in batches after business hours from
individual retail outlets to central processing locations or clearing
houses in electronic funds transfer systems, presents additional targets
for this type of abuse.
The second area of computer abuse is abuse to computerized assets
and computer services. These acts include theft of computer time
which may not, depending on the jurisdiction's definition of property
in the theft statutes, be subject to sanction, even though computer time
is a very valuable resource.5 An early case of abuse to computerized
4. The malicious mischief sanctions and anti-tempering statutes contemplate injury
to tangible personalty. For a full discussion of the law of selected states on this
point, see Nycum, The Criminal Law Aspects of Computer Abuse, 5 RUTGERS J. COM-
PUrEs & L. 271 (1976).
5. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 484 (Deering 1971); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,




assets is Ward v. Superior Court.' Ward obtained an intangible copy
of a proprietary computer program from the computer, where its owner
stored it, and caused it to be transferred to Ward's employer's computer.
Ward then caused a hard copy of the program to be printed and took
that copy. Ward's acts led to the first instance of a computer memory
being the subject of a search warrant. The court denied the defend-
ant's motion to dismiss the information charging him with taking a trade
secret in violation of the California Penal Code.7 The judge found that
there was probable cause to believe that a taking and carrying away of a
trade secret represented by the computer program had been committed.
This was the first time a computer program had been characterized as
a trade secret under the California Penal Code. The judge, however,
also found that the mere transference of the electronic impulses from
computer A to computer B did not constitute a taking of the trade
secret; the crime required Ward's carrying the printed copy to his office
to consummate the theft.8 It is important to note that computer display
devices enable a person to see a program, use it, alter it, and never make
a copy of the program itself. This loophole in the law is potentially
dangerous to software owners.9
Because of the deficiencies in the laws discussed above, Senator Ribi-
coff has introduced S. 1766, the Federal Computer Systems Protection
Act of 1977,10 which would make it a felony (a) to access certain
ANN. § 3926 (Purdon 1973); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 31.03 (Vernon 1974
& Supp. 1976-77).
6. 3 Computer L. Serv. Rep. [C.L.S.R.] 206 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1972).
7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 499c (Deering Supp. 1977). Section (b) of the statute
provides, in part:
(b) Every person is guilty of theft who, with intent to deprive or withhold
from the owner thereof the control of a trade secret, or with an intent to
appropriate a trade secret to his own use or to the use of another, does
any of the following:
(1) Steals, takes, or carries away any article representing a trade secret.
(3) Having unlawfully obtained access to the article, without authority
makes or causes to be made a copy of any article representing a trade
secret.
The company that employed Ward was subsequently found liable in a civil proceeding
for unfair competition.
8. The judge found that subdivision (3) of the statute encompassed Ward's crime.
3 C.L.S.R. 206, 209. See note 7 supra. The court said Ward could also be charged
with theft of property under the general theft statute. Id. at 210-11.
9. See, e.g., United States v. Bertram Seidlitz, No. 76-079H (D. Md. June 14,
1976).
10. S. 1766, as introduced in the Senate on June 27, 1977, provides:
SEC. 2. The Congress finds that-
Number 3]
Washington University Open Scholarsh p
532 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1977:527
specified computer systems for the purpose of (1) devising or executing
a scheme to defraud, or (2) obtaining money, property, or services by
false pretenses or representations or promises, and (b) intentionally and
(1) computer related crime is a growing problem in the Government and
in the private sector;
(2) such crime occurs at great cost to the public since losses for each
incident of computer crime tend to be far greater than the losses associated
with each incident of other white collar crime;
(3) the opportunities for computer related crimes in Federal programs, in
financial institutions, and in other entities which operate in interstate com-
merce through the introduction of fraudulent records into a computer system,
unauthorized use of computer facilities, alteration or destruction of computer-
ized information files, and stealing of financial instruments, data, or other
assets, are great;
(4) computer related crime directed at institutions operating in interstate
commerce has a direct effect on interstate commerce; and
(5) the prosecution of persons engaged in computer related crime is diffi-
cult under current Federal criminal statutes.
SEC. 3.(a) Chapter 47 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding
at the end thereof the following new section:
§ 1028. Computer fraud
(a) Whoever directly or indirectly accesses or causes to be accessed any
computer, computer system, computer network, or any part thereof which,
in whole or in part, operates in interstate commerce or is owned by, under
contract to, or operated for, on behalf of, or in conjunction with, any financial
institution, the United States Government, or any branch, department, or agen-
cy thereof, or any entity operating in or affecting interstate commerce, for
the purpose of (1) devising or executing any scheme or artifice to defraud,
or (2) obtaining money, property, or services by means of false or fraudu-
lent pretenses, representations, or promises, shall be fined not more than
$50,000, or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both.
(b) Whoever, intentionally and without authorization, directly or indirectly
accesses, alters, damages, or destroys any computer, computer system, or com-
puter network described in subsection (a), or any computer software, program,
or data contained in such computer, computer system, or computer network,
shall be fined not more than $50,000, or imprisoned not more than 15 years,
or both.
(c) For purposes of this section, the term-
(1) 'access' means to approach, instruct, communicate with, store data in,
retrieve data from, or otherwise make use of any resources of, a computer,
computer system, or computer network;
(2) 'computer' means an electronic device which performs logical, arithme-
tic, and memory functions by the manipulations of electronic or magnetic
impulses, and includes all input, output, processing, storage, software, or com-
munication facilities which are connected or related to such a device in a
system or network;
(3) 'computer system' means a set of related, connected or unconnected,
computer equipment, devices, and software;
(4) 'computer network' means the interconnection of communication lines
with a computer through remote terminals, or a complex consisting of two
or more interconnected computers;
(5) 'property' includes, but is not limited to, financial instruments, infor-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1977/iss3/22
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without authorization to access, alter, damage, or destroy those com-
puter systems.
The new federal Privacy Act of 197411 and the privacy laws of some
states' 2 address the problem of abuse to another type of computerized
asset-personal information. Those laws make it a misdemeanor
to wilfully maintain a secret system of records about individuals,
for an employee of a government agency wilfully to provide infor-
mation improperly to organizations or persons, and for an outsider to
obtain information which he is not entitled to by means of artifice or
mation, including electronically produced data, and computer software and
programs in either machine or human readable form, and any other tangible
or intangible item of value;
(6) 'services' includes, but is not limited to, computer time, data processing,
and storage functions;
(7) 'financial instrument' means any check, draft, money order, certificate
of deposit, letter of credit, bill of exchange, credit card, or marketable security;
(8) 'computer program' means a series of instructions or statements, in
a form acceptable to a computer, which permits the functioning of a computer
system in a manner designed to provide appropriate products from such com-
puter system;
(9) 'computer software' means a set of computer programs, procedures, and
associated documentation concerned with the operation of a computer system;
(10) 'financial situation' means-
(A) a bank with deposits insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration;
(B) a member of the Federal Reserve including any Federal Reserve Bank;
(C) an institution with accounts insured by the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation;
(D) a credit union with accounts insured by the National Credit Union
Administration;
(E) a member of the Federal Home Loan Bank Systems and any Home
Loan Bank;
(F) a member or business insured by the Securities Investor Protection
Corporation; and
(G) a broker-dealer registered with the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion pursuant to section 15 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.
(c) The table of sections of chapter 47 of title 18, United States Code,
is amended by adding at the end thereof the following: "1028 _ _
Computer fraud.".
123 CONG. REC. S10,792 (daily ed. June 27, 1977).
11. See Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (Supp. V 1975).
12. Omnibus Privacy legislation has been passed to date in the states of: Arkansas-
ARx. STAT. ANN. § 16-801 to 16-810 (Supp. 1977); California-Information Practices
Act of 1977, ch. 709, 1977 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 549 (to be codified as CAL. Crv.
CoDE § 1798 (Deering); Connecticut-CoNN. GEN. STAT. 88 4-190 to 4-197 (1977);
Indiana-Pub. L. No. 21, 1977 Ind. Acts -; Massachusetts-Mass. ANN. IAws ch.
66A, §§ 1-3 (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1977); Minnesota-MNN. STAT. ANN. § 15.165
(West 1977); New Hampshire-N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. 88 7-A:1 to 7-A:5 (Supp. 1975);
Ohio-Omio REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1347.01-1347.10, 1347.99 (Page Supp. 1976); Utah-
UTAH CODE ANN. 08 63-50-1 to -10 (1977); Virginia-V. CoDE §§ 2.1-377 to -386
(Supp. 1977).Washington University Open Scholarship
534 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
trick. The federal and state laws, which are generally similar, pro-
vide sanctions for theft of information from files maintained by gov-
ernment agencies. There is not, however, an existing remedy for
carelessness in transferring data, nor a method for insuring that once a
system has been compromised, either intentionally or through inadver-
tence, the data still maintains its integrity. There is no required
audit to insure that the information given subsequent to a disruption
of the system will be the same data as was recorded in the automated
system prior to that disruption. It is suggested that future case law may
establish further rights of data subjects whose records are contained in
an automated system of records. Recourse to traditional legal prin-
ciples will raise many of the same issues previously discussed in the
context of malicious interference with software or the theft of software
and data.
In the third category of abuse, where the computer itself is the per-
petrating tool or device, it is generally the targeted act, rather than the
means of perpetrating the act, with which the law is concerned. As most
of these targeted acts are traditional forms of embezzlement and fraud,
they pose little difficulty for the lawyer, judge, or jury. There is a seri-
ous problem, of course, for the law enforcement officer who must dis-
cover how the acts were perpetrated and how to provide evidence con-
cerning the perpetration. The case file contains many examples of
these perpetrations, ranging from very simple ones such as the kindly
keypuncher who ignored the names and addresses of friends when
typing up the master files for municipal parking violations to the massive
$2 billion Equity Funding fraud.' 3
There is a related concern and uncertainty with respect to the
responsibilities of auditors. Accountants' legal duties to investigate
have recently been expanded and they are cognizant of their extensive
potential civil and criminal liability under modern law. 4 At a time when
the responsibilities for detecting fraud have increased, the computer has
decreased the opportunity to successfully detect fraud. The accountant
can no longer be satisfied that he can properly audit the function of
an organization by traditional means. Unless he and his colleagues
13. See note 2 supra.
14. This trend may have been somewhat curtailed by Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185 (1976). The Supreme Court found that liability under Rule lOb-5 for




have computer skills, they are at the mercy of an automated record-
keeping system. And, even with computer skills, the ability to audit
may be limited to inspec abuses. 5
The fourth area of abuse, in which the computer is used as a symbol,
can also be subjected to a traditional legal analysis. The Federal Trade
Commission and others are alert to potential abuses by companies
which purport to match a customer with his life's dream by a computer-
ized dating service, or companies which purport to make the customer
a valuable member of the business community earning well over
$12,000 after a two-month course of "hands-on" computer experience
at the company computer programming school. More likely than not,
the customer does not meet anyone compatible through the dating
bureau, which may not even have a computer. Frequently, the com-
puter school does not have a computer on site, but only a terminal; and,
instead of becoming a programmer, the customer may be fortunate if
he learns how to operate the terminal.
There have been cases in which the computer has been blamed
either for loss of information or the use of incorrect information-
such as the "computer" loses the record of a life insurance policy, or
payment of a bill, or causes a policy to lapse, or a utility to be turned
off-and a company has tried to avoid responsibility for it. The courts,
however, have seen through the "computer" artifice and concluded that
behind the computer was a fallible human being who breached his duty
to exercise traditional human intelligence and skills.16
15. Inspec abuses, where the data inputted or outputted was improperly altered,
account for most dollar losses, see p. 528 supra.
16. See, e.g., Palmer v. Columbia Gas Co., 342 F. Supp. 241 (N.D. Ohio 1972),
a!f'd, 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973). Residential natural gas customers sought injunc-
tive and declaratory relief from Columbia Gas Company. The plaintiffs alleged that
the company terminated their gas service under color of state law without due process
of law. Although the crux of the case was whether the utility company acted under
color of state law and whether its termination procedures afforded its customers due
process, the court acknowledged the role of defendant's computer in the termination
process. The facts showed that estimated bills issued by defendant's computer were
often understated. When customers' meters were read, the discrepancies between the
computer's estimated charges and the customer's actual charges were often so high that
customers could not pay their bills. The issuance of termination notices was also
handled by the computer. The computer's role in the process, however, did not prevent
the court from granting plaintiffs relief against the defendant company. The district
court found that the defendant relied "uncritically upon its computer." Id. at 243,
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Conclusion
The rapid development of computer technology provides a perpetra-
tor with the capability to commit a wrong for which the present law
may have no remedy. Carefully drafted legislation at both the federal
and state levels may be the only way to effectively combat crime in
a computerized environment. Hopefully, state legislators will consider
introducing and supporting legislation similar to that proposed by Sena-
tor Ribicoff at the federal level to fill the gaps in state laws."
17. At this writing S. 1766 is not an ideal piece of legislation. The author and
others expect to suggest changes to the bill if hearings are scheduled.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1977/iss3/22
